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There is a significant number of existing polling and research on willingness 
of the Latvian population to defend its own country. The polling done for 
this research does not demonstrate significant deviations from the classical 
trends. The Latvian population traditionally has been prone to support 
its country against external enmities after regaining independence. The 
country of Latvia is being held dear, while criticism of the ruling political 
parties, politicians, the overall development of the state of Latvia has been 
high with clear signs of disappointment. Complicated relationships with 
neighbouring countries, in particular the Russian Federation, also increase 
the equivocal outlook among the Latvian population. 
This chapter will deal with the trends in willingness of the population 
of the country to defend Latvia. It will provide three central explanations 
of what has been influencing and shaping the attitudes of the Latvian 
population and what is influencing them now. The three aspects to reckon 
with are: the attitudes towards Latvia’s political and economic development 
over the last thirty years; the relationship with the Russian Federation 
(and Belarus); and the psychological and physical factors required for 
active actual defence. The chapter will argue that there is a significant 
disappointment and confusion among the Latvian population that prevents 
it from being stronger supporters of defending Latvia. The chapter will build 
on the polling data gathered for this research to demonstrate tendencies and 
make conclusions. 
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Attitudes towards Latvia’s political and economic 
development
Since Latvia regained independence, the willingness to defend the country 
among the Latvian population has had the tendency to decrease. The 
momentum of regaining independence, popular resistance against the 
Soviet Union and hopes for brighter future in the re-established nation 
state influenced the spirit of people. The uplifting feelings associated 
with the new state after the Soviet Union collapsed were visible through 
the Latvian society. Defending the state against external enemies was 
especially outspoken among the Latvian speaking part of the population. 
Poverty and living standard discrepancies between the Soviet Union and 
Western countries raised hopes for rapidly improving life as Latvia would 
tilt towards the West. 
The political, economic, and social transformation of the 1990s did not 
result in increased welfare for the masses. This together with continuous 
political scandals facilitated disappointment among the Latvian population. 
Lengthy inability to improve the living standards for most of the population 
in combination with widespread corruption, criminality, highly negative 
opinions in mass media, with lack of perspective on individual level can 
be regarded as reasons for disappointment and consequently — decreasing 
patriotism and willingness to defend the country. Disappointment in the 
state and its political leadership, and country’s slow economic development 
continued throughout the 2000s and into 2010s, especially when in the 
2008-2009 economic crisis hit Latvia hard. As the Figure 1 of the chapter 
“Willingness to Defend the Baltic States in Quantitative Terms” research 
demonstrates, the willingness to defend Latvia has been gradually 
falling and in early 2010s reached the record lows of approximately 30 to 
40  percent of the ones who are ready. The original disappointment about 
Latvia’s post-Soviet economic and political development in the 1990s was 
gradually substituted with growing disillusionment after Latvia was struck 
by economic and financial crisis in 2008.
Data demonstrate that despite post-crisis economic development and 
worsening of the geopolitical situation in the region, the willingness to 
defend the country has not been rapidly increasing. In 2014, when the 
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Ukrainian crisis emerged, the numbers of willingness to defend did 
increase, but the overall tendency of willingness to defend has kept falling 
instead. To explain the trend and the current situation with 2020 data, two 
factors must be analysed separately: economic disappointment and political 
disillusionment. The economic disappointment is related to the means and 
options that are available to most of the Latvian population both objectively 
and subjectively. The political disillusionment is tied to losing interest in 
political participation and sense of belonging to the nation state. 
Economic disappointment is tied to the fact that despite being part of 
the European Union, the Eurozone, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and many other multilateral economic 
organisations and institutions Latvia’s socio-economic situation is still worse 
than that of the most other European Union member states. Gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita of Latvia is not only at the levels of 69 percent of the 
EU average,1 but it is lower than that of the closest partners and historical 
friends Estonia and Lithuania. In reality, Latvia is the poorest country in 
the Baltic Sea region, besides Belarus and the Russian Federation. The fact 
that Latvia for 30 years already has been less developed economically in 
comparison to its closest neighbours does not facilitate the populations’ 
willingness to defend the country. 
Inequality levels in Latvia are significant, with GINI index still reaching 
35.1 in 2018,2 which does not help to improve the people’s trust and support 
for the country or its society. Risk of poverty and social exclusion is high 
in Latvia, with 26 percent of population being subjected to risk of poverty. 
Although the number has been steadily decreasing over the years, the 
absolute number of poor people in 2019 was almost half a million.3 This is a 
sour situation if one takes into account that people with a sense of economic 
safety in their country are the backbone of those willing to defend the 
state by any means against any foreign enemy. Those who have material 
possessions, especially real estate property and lifestyle that they could lose 
in case of foreign attack and change of the government, are more willing to 
defend the status quo, including their own country.
Economic disappointment over three decades has become embedded 
in some parts of the Latvian state. In particular, in Eastern regions with 
continuously high structural unemployment rates, lack of perspective and 
an unbreakable poverty cycle over generations.4 Low levels of accumulated 
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personal capital and economic perspectives lead to decreased willingness 
to defend the state. Sense of belonging and economic welfare cannot be 
separated. Willingness to defend the political system which has brought 
hardships and has not alleviated socio-economic burdens does not stimulate 
individual or popular support.
And this is tied to the second aspect  — the political disillusionment 
among the Latvian population. Political disillusionment is a result of several 
factors. Most important of which is the continuous lack of strong nationwide 
political narrative. Latvia is a multi-ethnic society with freedom of religion 
and all the traditional civil liberties guaranteed to most of the population. 
Meanwhile, not only the ethnical, religious, cultural disunity has limited 
the development of a strong dominating yet inclusive narrative. It is also 
the long-term challenges with exclusion of certain parts of the population 
from the political process. Moreover, the complexity of the country’s history, 
especially that of the World War II and the Soviet occupation, and decades-
long debates on historical memories did not result in generating one single, 
unifying message that would be acceptable to the majority of the population. 
Due to the communist experiences, the post-Soviet transition, the 
EU accession and the constantly evolving political, social, cultural, and 
economic value system, the Latvian society is often confused and lacks 
a clear national narrative that would serve as the basis for patriotism in 
Latvia beyond the Latvian ethnical group. Attempts to build a national 
narrative are also traditionally tied to Latvia’s past and history, neglecting 
modern day achievements and success stories. Such attempts at a national 
narrative ignore the natural diversity of every society and seek to exclude a 
wide range of smaller and bigger groups from the economic, social, legal, or 
political process. This exclusion over the past thirty years has diminished 
or prevented increasing the willingness especially of the ethnic non-Latvian 
population, i.e., predominantly Russian speakers, to defend the country. 
Ethnic non-Latvian population traditionally demonstrates low levels of 
readiness to defend the country. 
Yet, it is not only the lack of an overarching and inclusive national 
narrative that would fit the socio-economic and culturally linguistic realities 
of modern Latvia. It is also about the political disillusionment stemming 
from the democratic political party system and its actors’ behaviour. The 
political scene of Latvia for thirty years has been dominated by a high 
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turnover of political parties. The political parties tend to not only adjust their 
names frequently, but also change their leadership, political positions, and 
allegiances. A visible and confusing problem for voters is the regular birth 
of new parties and their alliances before every elections and fundamental 
transformation of existing political parties even while they are represented 
in the parliament. Both eligible voters and general population tends to follow 
and support individual candidates and their failure to gain power or fulfil 
promises is seen with disappointment. 
In addition — a large number of corruption scandals, as well as constantly 
high corruption perception in the country shows that the population 
distrusts the decision makers. Corruption scandals ranging from state 
capture to oligarchy and petty corruption have been a constant presence 
in the country. In addition to mismanagement of state funds, fraud cases, 
as well as inefficient public procurement procedures both on national level 
and municipal level, increases distrust in politicians and both elected and 
appointed officials. This has led to political disillusionment that is also 
clearly visible via the great number of protest voters at every election. 
A high number of people choosing to stay out of the political process, 
including elections, is also alarming and demonstrates that people do not 
see themselves as stakeholders in Latvia’s political process, affecting also 
the willingness to defend the country. 
Lastly, political disillusionment and economic disappointment is 
attributable to the low overall media-literacy level,5 as well as the limited 
understanding of democratic political process and free market economics 
among the general population. Too many people see themselves as being 
constantly played by the state, the decision makers, the entrepreneurs 
and the economic system itself. An abundance of political positions, media 
sources, as well as people-to-people connections within the country and 
with neighbouring countries have also an effect on willingness to defend 
Latvia. 
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Relationships with the Russian Federation (and Belarus)
The relationship with Russia and Belarus is a significant aspect to fully 
understand the willingness of the population to defend Latvia. Both 
neighbouring countries exercise significant presence not only in Latvia’s 
foreign and security policy, but also in Latvia’s media space and society’s 
mental space. Due to the Soviet past, there is a significant familiarity on 
the political, economic, and people-to-people levels. Diplomatic relations and 
economic cooperation between countries have been worsening over the past 
decade and currently have reached the level where Russia officially is seen 
as the main security threat of Latvia.6 Recently, also relations with Belarus 
have reached lows after the post-2020 election crisis. Meanwhile, for a 
significant number of Latvia’s inhabitants, personal family and friendship 
connections with Belarus and Russia play a substantial role in perceiving or 
not perceiving either of these countries as a potential threat. 
The case of defending Latvia against military threats from Russia is 
complex to explain. There is a greater number of factors that need to be 
considered. The first is that the number of ethnic Russians in Latvia is 
more than a quarter of population — more than 520 thousand. Out of those 
a little short of 137 thousand are non-citizens of the Republic of Latvia.7 
The same logic and principles apply in the case of established long-term 
family, friendship, and business relations. Familiarity with people from the 
Russian Federation influences the way how the Latvian society, regardless 
of ethnicity, perceives the possible threats from the big neighbour. 
Russian influence on the minds and hearts of the Latvian population is 
also actively exercised via Russian mass media, including entertainment 
programs. Due to widespread Russian language skills among the Latvian 
population and wide accessibility of programs originating from the Russian 
Federation, Russia may not be seen as aggressor or even a threat neither 
to Latvia, nor to the Western world in general. Russia may be perceived 
as misunderstood by the West and just exercising its legitimate national 
security interests. Such a perception is especially outspoken among the 
ethnically Russian population.
Belarus, on the other hand, has not been seen as an immediate security 
threat. Despite differences in geopolitical approaches and differences in 
political regimes, both countries have had constructive and improving 
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economic relations, regular political consultations and even moments of 
friendly relations. In the minds of many Latvian people, Belarus was seen not 
only as a friendly country, but even as an example of a successfully governed 
state. The Latvian society has not learned to perceive Belarus as a potential 
security threat and defending against it is not seen as a concern. Even 
now, with Belarus openly leading hybrid warfare against Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland, the population is not strongly positioned towards Belarus as a 
military security threat. Belarus like Russia should be considered from the 
point of view of active people-to-people relations. Common border regions 
and common economic projects are just the first examples. One should not 
forget almost 64 thousand ethnic Belarusians living in Latvia in 2021.8 
Approximately 28 000 of those are citizens of the Republic of Latvia and 
approximately the same number are non-citizens of the Republic of Latvia.9 
Among many other things, the high number of ethnically mixed 
marriages in Latvia contribute to the mutual understanding and decreasing 
willingness to defend the country against potential Russian (and Belarusian) 
invasion. The positive attitudes, predominantly among a significant part 
of Russian speakers in Latvia, towards Russia and its aggressive policies 
domestically and abroad are facilitated not only by the official channels 
but also by misinformation campaigns online. Very often people acquire 
their information about political processes from entertainment materials 
unrelated to news or credible information agencies. In combination with the 
distrust towards the national government and belief that “everyone lies”, 
the Latvian population tends not to accept the neighbouring countries as an 
actual threat and their populations as enemies. 
People don’t want to accept that things they like could be wrong. And 
the same thing applies to Russia (and to reasonable extend Belarus) as the 
most immediate threats that Latvia would need to be defended against. Low 
readiness to defend the country is also tied to the fact that Latvia is part 
of the European Union and NATO. This situation facilitates understanding 
and belief that war is not imminent. Threats from China, North Korea or 
Middle Eastern countries like Iran are too distant for the Latvian population, 
therefore they do not cause a sense of anxiety and necessity to be prepared 
for actual warfare. The geopolitical situation in the region over the past thirty 
years has influenced the threat perception and the psychology of the Latvian 
population and consequently their willingness to defend the country. 
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Psychological and physical factors 
Individual’s readiness to defend his or her country is an actual rational 
calculation based on arguments, fears, preferences, and mental pre-
disposition. It is a complex structure of concerns, embedded beliefs and 
expected practical outcomes from action or inaction. Each individual in 
Latvia forms their position towards war and defence of their own country 
based on their own personal experiences with military and defence 
structures and products, including warfare itself.
Peoples’ personal experiences with war may be an aspect influencing 
one’s readiness to defend the country with military means. Highest numbers 
of people willing to defend Latvia were registered during the national 
movement that emerged during the protests among others against the war 
in Afghanistan. With many young people having personal experience with 
warfare and being part of the two-year mandatory military service in the 
Soviet army, the attitude towards the possibility of war and individual’s 
participation in it was much more acceptable than nowadays. Several 
aspects are influencing this. 
The first aspect is that more than one generation has grown up in 
Latvia without personal experiences of war and armed conflicts. In 
combination with video materials and real time stories available via news 
channels, documentaries, and even social media, people are acquiring a 
distaste towards engaging in a modern-day warfare. Unwillingness to be 
killed or severely crippled “as seen on TV”, influences the way people are 
psychologically ready to defend10 Latvia. 
The abolishing of conscription in Latvia in 2007 has also had a direct 
effect on people’s readiness to defend their country via military means. 
People may see warfare as something very distant. They may see the war 
and defence as the responsibility solely of the professional army and not 
them personally. Additionally, a significant number of people in Latvia due 
to options to avoid military service when enrolment was still compulsory and 
because of the introduction of voluntary military enlistment have no practical 
experience with weapons, with military structures, with military equipment 
and modern war. Because of lack of military training, physical preparation 
and theoretical skills of warfare, the general population is ignorant towards 
war and does not think of itself as capable of surviving any armed conflict. 
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Even the basic information on military infrastructure in the country or 
behaviour during a military conflict is unknown to most of the people in 
Latvia. With this emotional feeling of helplessness, Latvian population may 
be more prepared to physically leave the country rather than defend it. 
Due to the aforementioned distrust in their own skills and physical 
abilities, people may tend to choose not to believe in a possibility of an 
armed conflict emerging where they could be asked to defend their country. 
Population will choose to believe that war is impossible rather than prepare 
themselves. Due to the inability to understand their role and place in the 
country in case of a military attack, individuals may choose to hope for the 
situation to never arrive instead of actively preparing themselves and their 
communities. 
Finally, it is about the communities  — friends, family, co-workers, and 
their willingness to defend the country. Defensive military actions are a 
mass event. The positioning and attitudes of the closest friends and Allies, 
as well as mass psychology is essential in convincing people to take action 
or to abstain from it. Lack of alternatives and threats to life, health, living 
standard, property and family are the reasons why people may opt for 
weapons. In case of missing immediate and unavoidable pressures, the 
choice may be alternatives to defending the country. Same is with the peer-
pressure — with existing peer-pressure people will chose to act one way or 
another. They may also choose to promise doing one thing or the other. This 
only means, that peacetime polling on people’s willingness to defend the 
country may not accurately present their actual readiness. 
Conclusions
The question if people are willing to defend Latvia is a complex one, that 
requires complex answers. The decreasing percentage of the population that 
is ready to defend the country can be explained by the overall development 
in and of Latvia within the past thirty years. The country has managed to 
achieve geopolitical and geo-economic stability and does not face immediate 
threats even from its most worrisome neighbours, especially Russia. Current 
low levels of readiness to defend Latvia that the population demonstrates 
should be considered as a natural outcome of the situation that the Latvian 
56
society has been living in. The readiness level to defend Latvia among the 
Latvian population is only around thirty percent due to several reasons: 
NATO membership and Euro-Atlantic partnerships as safety guarantees, 
biased views on Russia (and Belarus), low levels of skills and knowledge 
of how to act in case of military conflict, low levels of trust in the political 
system and political disillusionment, as well as high levels of economic 
disappointment within the Latvian society. 
Too many Latvian people do not feel like they are shareholders in their 
own country. They do not see the country worth defending. And they don’t 
see why they should be defending it against Russia, Belarus, or any other 
country. Hence, the country should think about its patriotism level and 
the possibility of deepening the bond with citizens via public diplomacy 
instruments such as open activities and public events. A good example is 
the “Latvian Song and Dance Festival”, where individuals feel a sense of 
belonging to the country and share common values. That kind of impact 
on society could contribute to the growth of the patriotism level and the 
willingness to defend.
One of the core problems are that individuals don’t know how to defend 
not only the country, but even themselves. Defence of the country has 
become something distant and most likely would be met with widespread 
panic and mass exodus. Consequently, engaging more people, both young 
and older, in military training, including via theoretical and informative 
programs on television and internet that the population can access at 
any time, would be a major step towards raising people’s awareness and, 
accordingly — the willingness to defend Latvia. 
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